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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DouBLE JEOPARDY-RETRIAL FOR GREATER
DEGREE OF OFFENSE CHARGED AFTER REVERSAL OF CONVICTION FOR LESSER
DEGREE OF SAME OFFENSE CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY '
In a second degree murder trial, the jury was charged as to second degree
murder, and first and second degree manslaughter. The jury found defendant
Ressler guilty of first degree manslaughter. Defendant appealed this conviction
to the Appellate Division, which remanded for a Huntley-type hearing.' At
the hearing Ressler's confession was found voluntary 2 Ressler appealed from
this finding, obtained a reversal on the law, and a new trial.3 From the order
of retrial both parties appealed. In affirming and setting guidelines for the new
trial, the Court of Appeals held, "Inasmuch as defendant was tried on an
indictment for murder in the second degree, but was convicted of first degree
manslaughter . . . he cannot again be tried on a more serious charge than
manslaughter in the first degree based on the same indictment." People v.
Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174, 216 N.E.2d 582, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1966).
Prior to 1888 the general rule in New York was, "[I] f the jury finds the
prisoner guilty on one count and says nothing in their verdict concerning the
other counts [in the indictment], it will be equivalent to a verdict of not guilty
on such counts."4 If the defendant appealed, "the reversal of the conviction
did not disturb the verdict of acquittal" with regard to the charges upon which
the jury remained silent.5 However, the defendant was considered to have
waived his constitutional protection against double jeopardy, 6 as to those
charges which he had been deemed acquitted.7 This rule was changed in 1888
when the Code of Criminal Procedure8 was interpreted by the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Palmer.9 The question presented by Palmer was,
whether ... the defendant, having been found guilty ... of a lower
degree of the crime than charged in the indictment [and having] suc-
ceeded in reversing the judgment . . . can be tried again under the
indictment without regard to -the former trial and conviction. 10
1. People v. Ressler, 23 A!).2d 514, 256 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d Dep't 1965) (Hearing to
determine voluntariness of confession, by county court without a jury, in accord with pro-
cedure prescribed in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1965); also called Jackson-Denno hearing).
2. People v. Ressler, 45 Misc. 2d 995, 258 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Rennesalear County Ct. 1965).
3. People v. Ressler, 24 A.D.2d 7, 261 N.Y.S.2d 823, modified, 24 A.D.2d 727, 262
N.Y.S.2d 1022 (3d Dep't 1965).
4. Guenther v. People, 24 N.Y. 100, at 101 (1861).
5. People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478, at 483 (1881).
6. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offence. . ."
7. People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478, at 484 (1881).
8. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.
§ 464. The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as
if no trial bad been had. All the testimony must be produced anew; and the former
verdict cannot be used or referred to, either in evidence or in argument.
§ 544. When a new trial is ordered it shall proceed in all respects as if no trial
bad been had.
9. 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.. 213 (1888).
10. Id. at 416, 17 N.E. at 213.
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The Court answered this question in the affirmative, reasoning that section 36
of the Penal Code, 1 which provided that "where a prisoner is ... convicted...
for a crime consisting of different degrees, he cannot thereafter be indicted
or tried for the same crime, in any other degree," applies only where judg-
ment of conviction remains unreversed,'1 2 and that sections 464 and 544 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure dictate that:
The effect of defendant's appeal is merely to continue the trial under
the indictment in the appellate court; and if reversal of the ... con-
viction follows ... the record of the former trial, has been annulled
and expunged... and [the proceedings] are as though they never had
been; while the indictment is left to stand as to the crime ... charged
... as -though there had been no trial.1
8
The United States Supreme Court in Kring v. Missouri4 was confronted
with a Missouri constitutional provision similar to the New York Code l
relied on in Palmer.'6 The Court held this provision unconstitutional as an
ex post facto law, but in its dicta indicated that it would not so hold under the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, as applied to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 7 After Palmer,'8 taking
an appeal from a criminal conviction became a "gamble" for the defendant. In
order to correct a legal error at trial, the defendant had to subject himself to a
new trial for the greater degree of the crime for which he had previously been
acquitted, in order to gain a reversal of the lesser charge upon which he had
been convicted. 19 This rule differs from the federal rule, applied in similar
situations, as set forth in Green v. United States.20 In Green the Supreme
Court2l held that,
the law should not . . .place the defendant in such an incredible
dilemma; [for] conditioning an appeal of one offence on a coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offence
exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against
double jeopardy.
22
Of the thirty-five states, other than New York, which have passed on this
question, seventeen hold in accord with the federal rule and eighteen hold
11. Now N.Y. Pen. Law § 32.
12. People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. at 419, 17 N.E. at 215 (1888).
13. Id. at 419-20, 17 N.E. at 215.
14. 107 U.S. 221 (1882).
15. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 464, 544, quoted supra note 8.
16. 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
17. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882).
18. 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
19. See, e.g., People v. Erode, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 152 NE.2d 77, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958);
People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92 (1911); People v. McCarthy, 110 N.Y. 309, 18
N.E. 128 (1888); People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
20. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
21. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion for the majority of five, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter for the four dissenters.
22. 355 U.S. at 193-94.
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in accord with New York,28 i.e., that on a reversal of a conviction for a lesser
degree of the crime than charged in the indictment, a new trial on the original
indictment is permitted.2 4 The United States Supreme Court has said in the
past that this type of reprosecution by a state is not prohibited by the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment as applied to the states by the four-
teenth amendment25 However,
the Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions according
the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of
basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when
they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme 26
In the instant case, the majority of the Court reasoned that the federal rule
had been made mandatory upon the states. The Court was led to -this conclusion
by the trend of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions. These
decisions indicate that an increasing number of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are being selectively incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and thus are made applicable to the states.2 7 The Court
also relied heavily on the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins. 8 In Hetenyi,29 the defendant was
convicted in a New York court and placed in a situation similar to that of
Ressler in the instant case. The United States Court of Appeals in reaching
its decision as to whether this type of reprosecution by a state violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment considered three alternative
standards, in applying the concept of selective incorporation:3 0 the Federal, the
Basic Core and that of Fundamental Fairness. 31 It held that "under any of
the three alternative standards the conclusion is unavoidable that New York
transgressed the federal constitutional limitations on its power to reprosecute
an individual for the same crime."1
32
The concurring opinion in the instant case reasons that this change, from
the state to the federal rule, should be based upon the double jeopardy pro-
vision of the New York State Constitution83 rather than the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This opinion
fails to take into account the approval of the state rule on constitutional grounds,
prior to the instant case, by the New York Court of Appeals in a long
line of decisions.3 4 The dissenting opinion contends that it is for the legislature
23. Id. at 216 n.4.
24. People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
25. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284, at 285 (1910).
26. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, at 5 (1964).
27. See cases cited in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, at 4-6 (1964); accord, Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
28. 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
29. Ibid.
30. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
31. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, at 855 (2d Cir. 1965).
32. Id. at 856. But see Comment, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 821 (1966).
33. N.Y. Const art. I, § 6.
34. See People v. Erode, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958); People v. Bellows,
437
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to change this law, if any change is to be made, and not the Court. However, if
the United States Supreme Court holds that this form of reprosecution by the
states is prohibited by the United States Constitution,85 as the majority in
the instant case reasoned it eventually would, the New York rule as to the ap-
plicability of the defense of double jeopardy in this form of reprosecution will
be supplanted by the federal rule. In this event, neither the New York Court of
Appeals nor its legislature will be the lawmaking body.
The Supreme Court has not, to this day, invalidated any convictions ob-
tained in the state courts on the ground that the state has transgressed the fed-
eral constitutional limitations on its power to reprosecute an individual for the
same crime.3 6 The Court has dealt with these situations on a case by case basis,
ruling that there was no violation of double jeopardy when a retrial was had
after: (1) discharge of a hung jury;8 7 (2) reversal of a conviction although
part of the sentence had been served; 38 (3) an appeal by the state from a
conviction for second-degree murder;30 (4) a grant of mistrial after an unex-
pected refusal of co-defendant to testify for the prosecution; 40 (5) defendant
was convicted of one of the two offences charged which were statutorily treated
as one offence with two different penalties, and retrial was had on both charges; 41
and (6) different offences occurring on the same occasion were prosecuted
at different trials.42 Although the Court has refused to accept the contention of
a person in a state court, that he has been subjected to treatment in violation
of the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, it has not precluded
the existence of a situation in which such allegation would be accepted.43 just
such a situation was present in the instant case. Ressler was forced to abandon
his constitutional protection against double jeopardy (to a charge of which he
had already been acquitted) in order to obtain a new trial on the charge upon
which he was convicted. The trend of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, referred to above, the treatment by that Court of these double jeopardy
281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939); People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92 (1911);
People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888); People v. Fiorillo, 20 A.D.2d 899,
248 N.Y.S.2d 958 (2d Dep't 1964); People v. Wheeler, 79 App. Div. 396 (4th Dep't 1903).
35. U.S. Const. amend. V: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . .. ."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV: "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . '
36. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, at 850 (2d Cir. 1965).
37. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
38. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
40. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
41. See Chichos v. Indiana, 35 U.SJ,. Week 4003 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1966). Mr. Justice
Fortas, dissenting, noted, "This is a State case. But the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement
of due process includes a prohibition of this kind of heads-you-lose, tails-you-lose trial and
appellate process." Id. at 4005.
42. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (Warren, Ch.J., dissenting, considered
the situation violative of double jeopardy protection. Id. at 473) ; see also Ciucci v. Illinois,
356 U.S. 571 (1958) (dissenting opinion to same effect; id. at 573).
43. United States Constitution Annotated, Doc. No. 758, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., at 1273
(1963).
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questions on a case by case basis, the refusal of the Court to deny the applica-
bility of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states, and
the dissents lodged in Williams v. Oklahoma,44 Ciucci v. Illinois,4 5 and Chichos
v. State46 indicate that the United States Supreme Court, when confronted
with this issue, will decide in *accord with the prediction made by the New
York Court of Appeals in the instant case.
JEFFREY SELLERS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MnRANnA: THE APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO CONFESSIONS-A
CHANGE IN APPROACH.
Ernesto Miranda was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping and raping
an eighteen year old girl. After being identified by the victim, he was escorted
to a special interrogation room to be questioned by police officers. Miranda was
not advised of his right to have an attorney present, nor made aware of his
privilege against self-incrimination. Though at first denying his guilt, within
two hours Miranda gave a detailed confession, admitting and describing the
crime. At his trial before a jury, the confession was admitted into evidence
over the objection of defense counsel. Subsequently, Miranda was found guilty
as charged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the conviction,
holding that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining
the confession.' The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
the conviction. Held, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpa-
tory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation2 of the defendant,
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards which effectively pro-
tect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Unless equally effective
safeguards are adopted, the following procedures must be employed: prior to any
questioning, thie person must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything said can and will
be used against him in court. He must be clearly informed that he has the
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during the in-
terrogation. Also, it is necessary to inform him that if he is indigent, a lawyer
will be appointed to represent him. If the individual indicates in any manner,
at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. Similarly, the opportunity to exercise his right
44. 358 U.S. 576, 587 (1959).
45. 356 U.S. 571, 573 (1958).
46. 35 U.S.L. Week 4003, 4004 (Nov. 14, 1966).
1. State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965).
2. Custodial interrogation is defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
